BARCELONA – SSR2 Face to Face Meeting - Day 2 (1 of 2) Wednesday, October 24, 2018 – 08:30 to 13:15 CEST ICANN63 | Barcelona, Spain

JENNIFER BRYCE: Is the 24th of October. My name is Jennifer Bryce, ICANN Organization.

We'll go around the table and then I'll hand it over to Russ. So, to my

right, Russ.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Russ Housely.

NORM RITCHIE: Norm Ritchie.

ZARKO KECIC: Zarko Kecic.

DENISE MICHEL: Denise Michel.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Eric Osterweil.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Scott McCormick.

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ALAN AINA: Alan Aina.

CHARLA SHAMBLEY: Charla Shambley.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Negar Farzinnia, ICANN Org.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thanks, everyone. We also have remote participants in the room. We

have Laurin, Matogoro and Naveed and Ramrkishna. And just to remind you, obviously, the meeting is being recorded and please state your

name before speaking so that helps with the transcript. And with that,

I'll hand over to you, Russ. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin, are you able to hear us and speak? Okay, when you're able to

speak, I'd like to circle back to recommendation four, because we don't $\label{eq:commendation} % \[\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(\frac{1}{2$

have a discussed position on that. And in the meantime, let's go to Scott

and recommendation 17.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: So, I was not seeing anything that – granted, I was doing more

homework later on, but I was not seeing anything that really

substantiated a yay or nay on this. Does anybody else have any input

on this one?



CHARLA SHAMBLEY: On 17?

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah.

CHARLA SHAMBLEY:

Yeah. So, I guess noting the text in the Google doc, I think where we left off on the conversation from Sunday was that much more clarity and transparency is needed on the SSR-related activities and budgets that are undertaken by ICANN. Although we've addressed 17 sort of separately, it also has connections to other recommendations that – relating to providing clear information on what the SSR priorities and budgets are.

So I think more – it's typical to tell from the public materials – or I should say the public materials show that some work is done, but it lacks clarity and specificity, I think, in terms of the SSR activities and that in my view, we need a much clearer process for providing public information on how SSR priorities are reached, what those priorities are, what resources the organization is bringing to bear on them and what the budget requests for each year entail as far as SSR.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So the last part says SSR2 should consider better metrics for evaluating the success. I'm trying to understand whether that is a call for a



recommendation here or we want to just note that we can't say one way or the other from the public materials and move on?

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, that seems to be an occurring theme through a lot of these, is that we think that some good work has been done but we can't find any documented evidence on it. At least I've certainly found that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yeah, so my two cents is we do keep running into this, but I think it is absolutely a fair response, basically. The last thing we want to do is be waving our hands at stuff if we can't evaluate something for one reason or another. I think that's perfectly fair and we can leave it to the reader to decide why it was so difficult.

DENISE MICHEL:

In general though, providing documentation for full implementation is sort of closure for the review. So in my view, if we can't substantiate full implementation, I think we just need to say that and we need to assess the implementation level and its impact based on the information at hand, and then I think move forward from there and determine whether we want to factor this activity into our next set of recommendations.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay, so what I typed at the top is that the recommendation calls for greater community participation, the development of objectives and priorities. And I should probably add SSR objectives and priorities. But



public material does not provide evidence that this has happened. Is there anything more to say? Yes, Zarko.

ZARKO KECIC: If I read this correctly, ICANN should establish more structured internal

process. How it is calling for community participation?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, so that's a question whether the SSR1 meant internal to ICANN or

internal to ICANN Org. That is - so maybe we have to go read the

surrounding paragraphs to confirm.

ZARKO KECIC: Anyway, this [is] internal.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Now we're in a dungeon. Okay, is there anything else to say on

this one? Okay. Scott, 18 is yours. You said this has been completed

annually except for FY16 and 17 – or 15 and 16, but you're not sure if it

was done for this year.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah, so I guess the question is why was 15 and 16 combined and then

18, there's no update on that. So I don't know, staff, if you want to put

a question in for what the status of FY18 is, but I'd also be curious to

know why 15 and 16 was conjoined.



JENNIFER BRYCE: Did you have a question? [inaudible].

SCOTT MCCORMICK: No, not at all. No, why was 15 and 16 conjoined? And then obviously,

what the status of FY18 is. It's out there on the website. Not exactly sure what the reason for 15 and 16 being conjoined is, but probably be a

good input.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Okay, thanks. I [can't] answer the question. I don't know if you can,

Negar, but we can take it back and we'll get back to you.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah, alright.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Last update I had, Scott, on this is our framework was that the FY18

framework was in development and it's not ready for publication just

yet, but it is in the works. We can certainly circle back with the team and

verify that though.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Is there anything else to say? Do we know – is there any artifact

on the site there that says why 15, 16 wasn't done? Or just wasn't done?

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

No, 15-16 was done but it was conjoined. It wasn't individual reports. Every year's been individual except for 15 and 16 which was conjoined.

NEGAR FARZINNIA:

So actually, Steve Conte provided an update on this topic to the review team during one of the plenary calls, and I recall – we can find out which meeting so we can pull out the information again. But he had said that the SSR framework is not necessarily created for every fiscal year, they're only created on an as-needed basis so to speak.

We will confirm with him why FY15 and 16 are combined. May guess is that the development of the document crossed over the two fiscal years and that's why it was only one. But they don't necessarily create one for every fiscal year.

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Yeah. I mean the recommendation was annual, so that's why I was – it goes back to like, I think, FY13. Yeah, I think it was FY12. So the question is, yeah, if they're doing it since 12, 2012, what's the difference?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yeah, I think that's actually in the text of the final report above recommendations, ICANN should maintain a consistent internal process for tracking assessment, bla bla, in discussions with the team, bla bla, staff agreed with our recommendation that it'd be helpful to conduct an annual operational assessment implementation progress as part of the process for developing following year's SSR framework.



RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, moving on to recommendation 19. Naveed provided some draft

text, so let's take a look at that. Negar, do we have an anticipated time

for a response to this one, to the outstanding question?

JENNIFER BRYCE: So the deadline for the question at the moment is the 2nd of November,

and as with all the questions, we'll try to get an answer to you before

that, but that's the current anticipated delivery date.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think the second sentence Naveed offered, what he's trying to say is

that the implementation comes - the documentation about the

implementation comes so far behind what's going on that it's a

retrospective thing, not an – inform the community as it's happening. Is

that correct? He's in the Google doc. I'm waiting to see when he's going

to type.

DENISE MICHEL: That was my understanding of it. In addition, the lack of predictability

of these processes is, I think, a further deterrent to community

involvement and sort of transparency in this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, anyone have anything to add to the text that is there now?



NEGAR FARZINNIA: Naveed has added a comment in the chat room. Would you like me to

read it out?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Please.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: He says, "What I mean to say is that there seemed to be no process

going on that offers involving the community in a proactive manner." He also says he can't seem to be able to join audio, can only hear and

type, FYI.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So from what he typed, I don't know if he's happy with the text that was

edited or not. Okay, if he doesn't - oh, he's typing.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Naveed says, "This is okay but I think we may need to revisit it once the

question is answered."

RUSS HOUSLEY: Fair. Okay. 20, Denise, this one's yours.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. So this ties to the previous recommendations as well. The text in

there shows that the – the implementation report says that ICANN will $\,$

integrate the SSR framework and reports on SSR activities and

expenditures into the planning framework and process and provide public information about these SSR plans, budgets and activities.

However, as we've also noted for recommendation 19, the portfolio management system and KPIs have extremely limited amounts of information in these areas, so this would not be very useful for the community to use to track SSR-related efforts, which is the point of this recommendation.

I provided more details on what I found in FISCAL YEAR 2018 budget in there, and then the implementation report also says that ICANN will identify mechanisms that provide more detailed public information on SSR-related budgets and expenditures across multiple ICANN departments and explore after-event reports relevant to threats that include budget and resource impacts related to managing the event.

So the annual reporting on these SSR-related activities does, to some extent, take place in the framework annual reports, but again, they're extremely high-level and a few high-level line items related to SSR that – so it's not fully implemented or useful for the intention of this recommendation. Let me see.

So in terms of intended effect, the SSR-related activities, as I said, appear at very high levels, but the implementation did not have the full intended effect. And then in terms of the relevancy for today and further work for the purposes of transparency and accountability, the recommendation continues to have relevance today and I would recommend that we revisit this as part of our additional recommendations.



This is very connected to recommendation 21, so I could continue and discuss that as well if you find it useful maybe. Okay. So 21 is in the same vein that ICANN should establish a more structured internal process for showing how organization and budget decisions relate to the SSR framework, including the underlying cost-benefit analysis.

So similar to 20, the implementation report notes specific deliverables, and – let me see. Need to refresh my memory. So the annual reporting on SSR-related activities, again, I've really just – the same findings are relevant to 21 as they are with 20. Very high-level, not enough information to fulfill the stated objective. And that for the purposes of transparency and accountability, this is still relevant and we should revisit this in the ICANN SSR workstream.

In terms of going back up to a higher level, I think the obvious objective for these types of recommendation really goes to transparency and accountability in the SSR area. And I think – pardon?

ZARKO KECIC:

[inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL:

And is important – well, for this review team but for the broader community that's interested in really understanding what ICANN's activities and resources and budgets are in the SSR area. And particularly for parts of the community that want to advocate for and support additional SSR activities, I think a greater level of detail is particularly important.



RUSS HOUSLEY: So, as the earlier recommendation, it calls for a more structured

internal process. So I understand how a public cost-benefit analysis would support what you just said, but I'm not sure that an internal

process would -

DENISE MICHEL: I'm sorry, I missed that. An internal process would what?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm not sure an internal process would educate the community on the

tradeoffs that were considered, which is what I thought you just said.

DENISE MICHEL: Well, I think, so broadly, there's a process in ICANN to set priorities, get

community input on the priorities and activities, get community input

on how budget allocations should be made. So I think it's connected to

that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I beat Zarko in paper, rock, scissors, so I'm going to go first. So just for

clarity, or at least for my clarity at least, in the final report said in the

context for these recommendations that are grouped together, there's

a great deal of discussion about specific amounts of money spent on

SSR activities.



It's called out as basically this is – it's sort of calling out if money's going to be spent in large amounts, it talks about \$7.863 million in FY12, etc. It's really called out to say if you're going to spend all this money, you're going to have to show us why. So I think it's designed to give a lot of transparency.

ZARKO KECIC:

Transparency is one thing. Having cost/benefit analysis in internal process is totally different thing. So this is not for public, this is clear internal process where ICANN had to establish budget for SSR. And how they all defend that publicly, that's another thing.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Can we go on mic, please?

DENISE MICHEL:

I think something else that can be reflected here is that – also what we're seeing in these 28 recommendations and as we read all of the reports and activities that are occurring within ICANN, there's a significant amount of SSR-related activities that are occurring throughout the ICANN organization, but it's very difficult to understand the priorities and the full complement of activities and the budget and resources – budget and [staff being that] ICANN is applying towards those activities in the documents that are developed and posted publicly, something that kind of goes to the heart of 20 and 21.



RUSS HOUSLEY: So, you're suggesting a recommendation that says the budget and the

SSR framework need to be more tightly correlated. Is that right? Or

publicly available.

DENISE MICHEL: And a much greater degree of granularity and availability to the public.

Yeah.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Kerry-Ann has her hand raised in the room.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Kerry Ann, are you able to speak?

KERRY ANN BARRETT: Yeah. Had to dial in. There's no audio available in the Adobe Connect in

terms of speaking. I was listening to the conversation regarding this

recommendation. Whenever the final text is on [our] comment, I think

we shouldn't emphasize so much – I know the transparency, when I've

read it, I felt the transparency dealt with, as Russ just said, correlating

what SSR issues are and how the funds are allocated to address it.

But I would be conscious and ensure that our language doesn't

emphasize the amount of money spent versus what the output is only

because our remit – or even the remit probably of the SSR1 team was

not to look at probably a cost-benefit analysis, but whether or not the

SSR issues are addressed based on the allocation and the budget. Was



the budget sufficiently supplied, or was the budget sufficiently applied to areas of SSR concerns that would really affect the DNS?

So I think how we phrase it, having pointed out whether the budget was large or small, it's more [inaudible] whether or not the budget was sufficient to ensure that SSR concerns are met. As I said, the transparency, for me, when I see this, it's more in relation to what were the SSR issues, was the budget allocated accordingly, was the budget sufficient, not sufficient? But we won't be able to give a true assessment on but just to probably encourage to ensure that once budgets are allocated, that it addresses SSR issues that are identified.

If I'm not clear, I could repeat.

DENISE MICHEL: Hi, Kerry Ann. That's, I think, very useful, and I would agree with that.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Russ, Zarko has his hand up.

ZARKO KECIC: I'll again read this recommendation and ask again where is the

connection between community and this recommendation? "ICANN

should establish a more structured internal process for showing how

organization and budget decision related to SSR framework included in

the underlying cost/benefit analysis.



So what the recommendation is saying before budget was allocated for SSR on by need basis, by asking basis, by how much somebody is ready to allocate for SSR, and this recommendation is just asking to have cost-benefit analysis and what SSR activities will be. So there is no public involved into it.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

The entire setting for these recommendations that comes before in the final report is based on observations that there is a large amount of money earmarked and that the public wants to know for what. So the recommendations are motivated by the transparency of why is all of this money that's quoted from FY11 and 12 earmarked for SSR activities, and is that where they should be spending money? That's the motivation for the recommendations in the report.

ZARKO KECIC:

Eric, if I tell you, "Okay, please do plan your [home] budget on cost/benefit analysis, you're spending too much," do I have to know how you're doing that?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

If you gave me the money in the first place, I think you have the right to know how I'm spending it is how I would respond in general. That's just my two cents.



DENISE MICHEL:

So yeah, I think I'm understanding this recommendation, and this is sort of a very brief summary of the full report and recommendation in this report. And taken together, 21 indicates that a more structured process – so ICANN has a specific process that they had documented on how they identify what activities in SSR that they're undertaking, what their priorities are, what their proposed budget is and then how they're measuring the success of those activities and factoring that into their next fiscal year's budget.

And so my reading of the report was that was the intention of 21, that they establish a better process for showing how throughout all of the ICANN organization they are developing these budget decisions related to SSR and then noting that that includes a cost analysis of the key items. And then that ties to 20.

It's actually very in line with what the ccNSO says almost every year about providing more specificity in the operating plans and budgets of ICANN, providing up front what the metrics are for success, and then reporting on that before asking for additional budget in the next fiscal year. I think it's in line with that as well.

JENNIFER BRYCE:

If I can relay some comments from the remote participants, Kerry Ann agreed with Denise's comment and in response to Eric's note says, "But we have to consider how we spend in details does not address whether it's sufficient for the need of SSR." And Naveed has also said, "What I mean to say is that the recommendation itself –" sorry, this keeps moving. "The recommendation itself doesn't call for having a publicly



available material that shows this has been done, but certainly, there should be a clear internal process, which doesn't seem to be there."

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So, thanks, Jennifer, for relaying those comments. Just to sort of underscore the back and forth – I don't have the page numbers clearly listed in the final report, but in the section just as illustrative, they above the recommendation say there is a breakdown, a whole bunch of number and outline of expenditures, and it says if we attempt to track how the overall amount is broken down across these activities however, there is little detail to support further analysis within the plans.

Following request to ICANN staff, we obtained a further breakdown that showed that for FY12, the budget under control of the CSO is personal cost, USD 1.2 million, admin cost USD 35,000, travel, 244,000, PS, \$1.15 million. In analyzing ICANN spending in initiatives such as SSR, we must take into account that the budget allocated was spread across multiple departments and people.

So basically, they're specifically asking whether we would agree with the recommendation or not to know how is the money broken down and spent as it relates to SSR. So I think that's all the recommendation's asking for. I think if we get into whether it's a good recommendation or not, we might wind up in a rabbit hole.



ZARKO KECIC:

What is my point, recommendation doesn't ask involvement of community. Recommendation says only about internal process of establishing budget, and they have to do budget breakdown and cost/benefit analysis. So, are we going to do this, why we are going to do this, and how much it will cost and what benefits we'll have out of that. And they were asking that. How they will publicly announce that, that's another thing. It is not over here, it is somewhere else.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

I agree.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, what I'm hearing is that the response is that this calls for a more structured internal process but public material does not provide evidence that this has happened. Is there anything we want to follow on and encourage them to or not to do?

ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah, but there is link which says public process in it, and there is nice schematic showed, there are some documents and explanations, and here is fiscal year 19, adopted five-year operating plan update and stuff like that. So there is something. How good it is, we have to check.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, you're saying the public materials are there -



ZARKO KECIC: [About process.]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Of a process. It's more just an output, isn't it? At least that's how I took

it, but maybe I went too fast. Go ahead, Eric.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Is this something that we should post process while we make further

progress to the recommendations, or is this a blocking action [to]

anything?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Denise, when you went through it, you seem to have said that the

related activities do appear in the annual budget but at a very high

level. So I think you were asking for greater granularity. Is that right?

DENISE MICHEL: Correct, both 20 and 21.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so

JENNIFER BRYCE: Naveed has comments on both recommendations 20 and 21. He says,

"Is it necessary to have the publicly available material for making sure that this has happened? And the process should be there but there can

be other ways of verifying it."



DENISE MICHEL: I would agree with that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm not sure whether he wants us to change the words or not based on

that.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Naveed, can you please confirm your answer to Russ' question?

Naveed, Russ is asking if you want us to change the wording based on your comments or if you're happy to continue with the wording that's

here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Zarko, then Norm.

NORM RITCHIE: This seems to be a very much recurring theme for us right now, is not

having the public evidence that something has or has not occurred. So

can we just maybe put that as an overarching text around the review of

this and then not constantly be debating it with every question?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, I support that, but I think we're going to – we need to do the

analysis each and then lay out when we draft final text in the report,

figure out whether we just point to the ones we want to raise that about



or we want to say in general that kind of a thing. And I don't know, I don't think we can know which is best until we've done this analysis, [I fear.]

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. Just my own personal experience is it's knowing when to stop

digging.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [Yes. Exactly. I'm struggling with that.]

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, how deep is the treasure chest, right?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Naveed said he's edited the text in 21 a little bit.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, is there anything else on 21? Alright. 22, Denise, this is yours as

well.

DENISE MICHEL: So 22 also relates to organization and budget resources, but this time

in conjunction with the introduction of new gTLDs. So as I noted, there's

again some similarities to approaches for recommendations 20 and 21, and so in supporting staff's contention that it's been fully implemented, they repeat the previous deliverables that they provided for recommendation 20 and 21 without providing the evidence of any specific work actually related to the new gTLD program.

So without having any additional information, it does not appear that this recommendation was fully implemented. And it provides some additional details and observations there. So my conclusion from reviewing this information is that the implementation status is that it was not implemented.

In terms of the intended effect, I note that in reading the SSR1 report, it's clear that the team indicated that they saw the new gTLD program coming and having significant SSR-related impacts, which is why they were asking that the budget and resource and activity reporting be separate and clear so that the community could see those specific reports and how ICANN was handling SSR-related elements of the new gTLD program.

And then in terms of relevancy for today, like the previous two recommendations, for the purposes of transparency and accountability, the recommendation continues to have relevance today, and I think this is something that we should look at as we develop additional recommendations.



RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, when you say that this is still relevant, I'd like to hear whether people think we just say "You didn't do this yet" or we are going to make our own recommendation.

DENISE MICHEL:

I think both. I would suggest both, that it wasn't implemented, it's still relevant, and I think as part of our activities, we should take a fresh look at where the new gTLD program is today, what ICANN has done and is planning to do in the area of SSR. Gets us into some pretty critical programs such as EBERO and some of the other things we already looked at and we've got some background information on.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Oops. Okay. Any further discussion on 22? Okay, on 23, KC put comments in the Google doc.

DENISE MICHEL:

I agree with KC's assessment.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I'm still reading. So I finished reading it and I think I agree with her assessment, but she goes to great length about the free from internal and external pressure, and points out that this is the place where we're supposed to have those discussions in the multi-stakeholder environment. So rather than free from, it's more like all points of view need to be taken into account. Right?



Okay, welcome. So I've written here there's money in the budget for SOs and ACs and their input is part of the budget planning process. There are operating procedures that talk about self-management of conflict of interest, and ICANN needs to be a place where all points of view are expressed. Is there anything else to capture from all of this very detailed stuff?

NEGAR FARZINNIA:

Laurin says he has his hands up.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Hello, everybody. I hope this is working. Can you confirm?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

We hear you.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Excellent. That is better than I expected. I just wanted to add to this, and I think you also touched upon this. The problem is I think we look at SSAC and RSSAC, and at the same time, we should probably discuss and make a note about [inaudible] SSR-related positions, problems, discussions in communities that are not SSAC or RSSAC.



Because we do have in the community, I think, this feeling that particularly SSAC often is the kind of place where everything gets kind of offloaded and SSAC do the thing. At least this is what I've heard from quite a few people. So it might make sense to think about if there is a point to be made in relation to this recommendation to connect the SSR issues more broadly and to deal with these questions more broadly.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, Laurin, I think I've heard that kind of a thing in the hallway too, but can we point to a place where some SSR-related activity in a working group or other non-SSAC, non-RSSAC took place but was an unfunded mandate?

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

As far as I know, no, but I think that is also an interesting thing, because there are groups who definitely do have interest in these types of questions and they're relevant to what they're doing and what they're talking about. And I think that is an indicative thing already, that this seems to happen, but there seems to be nothing going on.

So I'm not sure if this is specifically only related to this recommendation, it's just something that I thought of in the context of this discussion, and I'm wondering if we need to put this here, if we need to address it at all, or if we can just say, okay, let's not touch upon this.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So I've put a note in here to ask ourselves that question. I'll -



LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes, I think that's perfect.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: We can come back to this at a later point. I just thought it makes sense

to have it somewhere.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Kerry Ann has her hand up. Kerry Ann, do you have your hand up? If so,

just go ahead and speak, please.

KERRY ANN BARRETT: Okay. I had just wanted to comment on the last sentence of our

observation ICANN needs to be a place where all points of view are

expressed. Russ, I'm not sure if that's – I mean I could be wrong. I don't

know if it's clear enough, because it seems as if we're making an

assumption where it's not a place where all points of view are

expressed, [even taking] into account what Laurin just suggested or

asked.



I think based on the recommendation, it seemed to have been more that it's not just expressed but taken into account. I think even from like the GAC perspective, oftentimes recommendations would be sent up from GAC and it's not all the time that it seems as if the concerns or considerations raised were taken into account even if the recommendations were not adopted.

If you even take into account what happened with our team last year, I think it's more to ensure that any work that has been undertaken by any advisory committee or working group should have sufficient support, financially and otherwise and feel at liberty to do whatever the task is and objectives that they were given. So I think it just needs to be clarified.

As I said, ICANN is always, I guess, encourages the community to express their views, etc., but I just thought that seemed a bit openended. That last sentence [I don't think it] hits the point and could leave room for questions rather than address what we're trying to conclude on the recommendation and its implementation.

[inaudible] suggested language, but I don't know if you could clarify why [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, I changed it to "Where all points of view are taken into account" as opposed to "free from external or internal pressure." Anything else on 23? Either Scott or Boban, you want to take us through 24?



SCOTT MCCORMICK:

24, ICANN must clearly define charter, role and responsibilities of the chief security office team. I'm not sure this has been defined really, and I keep getting questioned about this even in just side talks. So I don't know if anybody's found anything that has really – can be a conclusive evidence towards this. Eric?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So, it looks like John Crain's organization has sort of succeeded in the SSR aspects of the CSO role, so we might sort of frame our answer in the context of, is the chief security, stability, resiliency officer's organization clearly enough defined?

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Well, I think there's a difference between the – so ICANN has a CTO, which is David Conrad, and then there's a chief SSR officer which is John Crain. So the question is, I mean, frankly, if we're talking about chief security office team, what does that mean?

DENISE MICHEL:

That's a good point, and remains particularly relevant today as there's a critical need, for example, to have SSR staff input and involvement into how ICANN is interpreting and applying for example GDPR to the WHOIS database or further assessing SSR impacts on new gTLDs as they head towards trying to develop another round.

So it's important for those reasons as well, I think, and remains very timely and something we should consider further.



SCOTT MCCORMICK:

If we're reading down into this, yes, we have a CTO at ICANN, we have a chief SSR, but if we read down into this, it's CIO and CTO. I don't think – does ICANN have a CIO? I thought it was just David Conrad which is CTO. Could be totally wrong.

BOBAN KRSIC:

ICANN hasn't CIO, has [inaudible] CTO. But what was the recommendation? The recommendation was to clearly define the charter, roles and responsibilities of the chief security office team. And there is also comment that I wrote over there. I can't remember, we started with a kickoff of our review in Copenhagen, and David Conrad gave a presentation about roles, responsibilities, tasks and so on of the OCTO team.

So maybe we can ask them if they documented it, why they, I don't know, don't published it on the Internet or what else, but I'm pretty sure that there is something, yeah, because we saw it. And yeah, we can also take this into account and say, okay, regarding GDPR or anything else, yeah, we need to recommend something here. But I think it's a legal case.

So Legal has to decide, okay, what does it mean for registrars and registries, and maybe OCTO can, I don't know, help fulfilment of the requirements. So I would ask them. I would draft them a message and ask, "Okay, have you defined it? Okay, show me the documentation" and that's it. And after that, we can recommend something or not.



ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Actually, listening to the discussion, I kind of have a different perspective than I had a second ago. And I'm not sure what the motivation or the spirit behind the recommendation was, so maybe I'm misreading it again, but a chief security office, CSO, there's a number of ways in which you can define that. there's some expected roles from an organization CSO, things that you would expect a CSO would do for an organization in general.

It's possible the recommendation is asking, "Can we ensure that ICANN is fulfilling these sort of necessities for a large organization?" Or could be that in the past where there has been a CSO, which isn't currently the case, the role's amorphous. So it's really not clear. We might need to sort of decide how we want to interpret the recommendation itself, because on the one hand, if we're saying the ICANN organization needs the security protection function that a CSO might give, whether it's like physical security or anything else, then we would have to assess like for example John Crain's group may not be the sort of canonical CSO function because it is more slanted towards SSR. So, are we thinking this recommendation is talking about is that function embodied by a set of roles in ICANN, or are we thinking this was aimed at defining a set of activities [is] where they fit?

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

My hand's up [inaudible]. Eric, to address your question, apparently in 2011, there was a role called the chief security officer. Jeff Moss was actually appointed back then as the chief security officer. So I think the



recommendation relates back to that role that did exist then. So [would have been a] chief security officer's team based on the appointment of the CSO back then.

So I think the latter part of what you said in terms of this role [seemed to have worked], I think based on the presentation we had gotten in Copenhagen, I think it seemed as if OCTO was created along with some of the other roles to kind of expand the CSO role as it was back then. But in 2011, as I said, Jeff Moss was appointed as the chief security officer. So I think the recommendation used that terminology based on the existence of that role as of 2012, 2013 during the SSR1 Review Team period.

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Good point. Yeah, I forgot about Jeff. It's been a while since he's been around. So yeah, if we think about back in 2011, yeah, there was a CSO. When did David come in to be the CTO? Was that when Jeff left? I'm just trying to think of how did we go from a CSO to a CTO or CIO, chief SSR officer.

ZARKO KECIC:

[inaudible].

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

No, I'm saying we shouldn't have a CTO, a CIO, a CSO within ICANN.



KERRY ANN BARRETT: [It depends – sorry, just to –]

SCOTT MCCORMICK: That's a lot of duties that overlap.

KERRY ANN BARRETT: Just for clarification, "October 29th, 2013, Jeff Moss announces his

departure as chief security officer, and then John Crain has been named as ICANN's new chief security, stability and resilience officer. In this newly created position, Crain will assume the responsibility of Jeff Moss

who announced he's stepping down from the position of CSO at the end of the year. Crain's team will focus on SSR," and it gives [inaudible]

about John. I think October 2013 is when the roles got switched.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: So, if that's the case, when did John Crain take over as chief SSR and

David become CTO?

KERRY ANN BARRETT: I'll have to research David, but John took over the role in October, 2013.

He was appointed that year. I can check [inaudible] David.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Appointed as what?

KERRY ANN BARRETT: As chief security, stability and resiliency officer.



SCOTT MCCORMICK: Okay. But David is now CTO and we have John Crain as chief SSRO –

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: CSSRO.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: CSSRO.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's what he calls himself.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, Zarko, then Negar.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, I just wanted to add something here. There is a page that defines

security, stability and resiliency officer of OCTO, and that's on icann.org/octo-ssr. And it says, "The overall goal of OCTO SSR program is to ensure security, stability and resiliency of Internet's identifier system. To achieve this goal, ICANN will engage [effectively its] security

operations and public safety" and so on.

Sot here is definition of John Crain's team. And we can call him whatever we want, CSO or SSR security officer, but there is definition.



NEGAR FARZINNIA: Thank you. I just wanted to confirm that David Conrad joined ICANN as

CTO in June of 2014. Just to clarify the timing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I guess we've been informed that the CTO and the SSR role within

that and the CIO coordinate to address ICANN's internal and external $\,$

 ${\tt SSR}\ responsibilities.\ The\ question\ is,\ do\ we\ have\ clearly\ defined\ charter$

roles and responsibilities?

BOBAN KRSIC: As already mentioned, I haven't seen them, there are not policy

available. So what we have is the site on the [inet] where the definition

is, what the responsibility is OCTO has, but that's it. And I would like to

propose to ask them if they have it and they can drop us a message,

show the documentation, and then we can decide what to do with this

recommendation.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I was just going to say the same thing. The key word in that

recommendation that we're struggling with is "clearly." So the roles

seem to be there, but they're at a high level, it's not – if someone said,

"Let's find the security roles," I would not know they have to search in

the CTO office to find those.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Eric.



ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So, again, I'm just reading from the final report that frames this recommendation, and rather than read the long section, section [4.3.2,] longer-term future risk that motivated this question. And if you read through it, it talks about getting advice from groups like RSSAC and SSAC, from the IETF and from the IAB. It goes all the way down through talking about how the technical evolution, the multi-stakeholder environment and the landscape shifting and making sure that at the end, it says that basically, they want to make sure – the team was concerned that ICANN had properly resourced itself to be aware of the evolution of the landscape so that it could be prepared to keep up with changes and make proper recommendations.

So while I think if we looked up a canonical definition of what a chief security officer is for an organization, we might have fun trying to fit that to ICANN. I think more to the point, this recommendation was probably making sure an organization like John Crain's chief security, stability and resiliency office was in place. So my thinking would be – I encourage everyone to read [4.3.2] to see, but it looks like the creation of John's office was actually directly fulfilling the spirit of that recommendation.

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

Eric, I agree with you. I was about to say something similar. I think it's not a matter that – I think the roles and responsibilities, even when you go on the website of, as you said, John Crain's office, it's clearly outlined. I think what's missing is the correlation between the two



departments in terms of where does one start and where does one end and how they actually correlate on cross-functional issues.

I think that is what's missing now, so having created the two offices and they are addressing SSR, I think it's more our observation could be centered around not clear public documentation up the road but more clear public documentation of the interoperability between the two offices, recognizing that the roles and responsibilities are outlined on the website. And based on the presentations we've had and briefings so far, they seem to get their mandates either from the – after the annual meetings or the reports from the board, but it seems to be more that the correlation is what's missing on cross-functionality.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yes, I'd agree with that.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Did I capture that correctly, Kerry Ann?

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

Yes. Thank you, Russ. Just probably one thing, Russ. Instead of just "clear," probably "clearer." Because I think it's on the website. Either probably "more specific" or "clearer," but something more specific, yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Does that help?



KERRY ANN BARRETT:

It does. I just don't want anyone to assume that we haven't checked publicly available information that is actually there. And when you put what we have, just "clear," it's not sufficient for someone reading it to determine what is unclear about it. So it was just to make sure that we are identifying that information is available. [inaudible] the sufficiency of the information for our needs, it's one thing, but I think we need to have in our language that we acknowledge that there is publicly available information on the roles and responsibilities. [Is] it sufficient for our needs? Maybe not, but I think we have to acknowledge that in the language somehow and not leave room for persons to assume that we haven't read the website or gotten briefings.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Moving to recommendation 25 unless someone has something more to add. Okay, three people put their names on this one, two of them are in the room and one of them is on the phone, so I don't know who's going to take the lead.

BOBAN KRSIC:

I would like to start with the blue highlighted text here. So we were in October last year [in L.A.] and talking with ICANN CFO, Xavier, about ICANN's risk management methodology, framework and processes. So we saw documented risk assessment process, how they treat risks, how they organize it, how they report it to the board.



We talked about risk acceptance criterias and criterias overall, and that's my personal opinion on that, what I can say, that's a methodological approach, process [that ICANN has] implemented and is based on best practices. So we saw threat analyses and evaluation of them. They talk about probability, occurrences and so on. So that's it, yeah. It is not [publicly] available, so we have signed an NDA to get information, and that's what I remember. So maybe someone who also were with us there can add something.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I'm sorry, I just want to drill down on one thing you said. You said the results of this are not publicly available. Is the process publicly available?

BOBAN KRSIC:

We can google it [if you want, and then I will say] yes. I'm not sure.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So it is out there, the description of the process.

BOBAN KRSIC:

Yeah, I know what you mean. I'm not sure. I didn't find it. Zarko, can you

remember, maybe?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I'm sorry, go ahead.



ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, it is somehow high-level described in framework, but it is not

exact process how it is done, because really, we had to work really hard to get information during L.A. meeting. And what I have to say, they are doing good job on that, and it is normal not to have publicly available

that information.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, the process can be public, but you don't say, "Hey, here's where

I'm vulnerable."

BOBAN KRSIC: Russ, found it. I've put the link over there. So the risk management

process is online and is from 23rd of January, 2015 and published on

the website.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, do you think it would be summarized as fully implemented?

Actually, the recommendation doesn't call for a public process.

BOBAN KRSIC: Well, what we can say is I would say there is a process in place, yes, but

I'm not sure if ICANN will identify all long-term risks, and so yeah, there

is a process in place, but the question is, okay, how do you deal with it?

So how they identify risk, how they mitigate them, that's also the

question. What's the risk treatment of them, are they only accepting



them all or are they really mitigating them? So yeah, when you ask me, "Is there a process in place?" Yes, I would say the recommendation is implemented, but how would I deal with risks and are they identifying all of them, that's the question, yes.

ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah, that's not our job to discuss about how they're implemented. The process is there, they're doing good job, they're using best practice. So I believe the answer is yes.

DENISE MICHEL:

While I would agree that they appear to have a robust risk management framework, it's far from clear how that is fed into the strategic plans and the annual operating plans. So I think it's important to take recommendation 25 in the context of the discussion in SSR1's report and also address, and perhaps this should be addressed in, does it remain relevant? Is looking at how the processes are connected so it impacts the actual results and activities of ICANN.

NEGAR FARZINNIA:

Kerry Ann has her hand up in the room.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Go ahead, Kerry Ann.



KERRY ANN BARRETT:

Hi, Russ, just [in terms of] the final language of our comments on this, I wouldn't use the language "fully implemented," because it would seem as if our team is signing off on the sufficiency. Because it does put in place mechanisms to identify both near- and long-term risk, and based on Boban's comment concerning – it's not just the publicly available information, but our being able to verify whether or not these identified risks are [iterated] in terms of them taking it into account for future planning or not.

I think we could probably say not partially, but I would probably suggest the language that mechanisms seem to have been put in place. But we would further recommendation that these mechanisms be updated with ICANN ensuring that identified risks are taken into account for future planning. Something very specific, because I don't think based on the assessment that was done in L.A., we could sufficiently say that it's been done.

For example, the last version of the DNS resiliency [chart,] and somebody could tell me if they found a more current one, the only one I'm seeing online is one that dates back all the way to 2014 as well, and it may be sufficient for today, but all the identified risk, they [inaudible] opportunity cost. They have levels one and two. I'm not sure if it speaks about [inaudible] risk, systemic risk.

I'm not sure if this model has been updated since 2014, and we've had new threats and new mechanisms put in place [by] ICANN since then. I can paste that link in, but I think we should just ensure that we identified that processes are in place. However, we think that there



should be more clarity as to how identified risks are taken into account for future planning, something very specific.

I don't know, Boban, if they had showed you this document during the L.A. I wasn't able to go, but I don't know if that was updated in addition to the risk management process in [January] 2015, if [they've both] been updated since.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

At the bottom of the document that Boban posted the link into the Word document, there's a strategic risk that ICANN may face document referenced with a 2016 date. I'm sorry, a 2014 date. But it was aiming at strategic risks for the 2016 to 2020 time period.

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

And I think that's my concern, is that a lot of it is dated back then, but to actually show that there is a proactive methodology to looking at previously identified risks, newly identified risks and future risks as a result, because the risk landscape would change accordingly. So future planning [2016 to 2020 or 2016 to 2022 is proactive.] In terms of looking forward for whether or not this is [inaudible] updated, I think it's something that we should recommend to supplement [our position] on recommendation 25.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Go ahead.



ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah, I have comment on this. What Kerry Ann is saying is correct, but what we had seen in L.A., they are updating their risk analysis, and they are doing that correctly. And I would suggest not to lose time on this one, because we'll cover this much deeper in ICANN security part. So we'll come back to this.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Eric?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So, I absolutely think moving forward and getting going [with it] is a great thing, so I sort of have to slap myself on the hand, because as we've lingered on this one, I've looked at it more carefully and it looks to me like it's saying something much more nuanced. So maybe we're discussing that Kerry Ann's touched on and Zarko kind of touched on, but it's talking about a mechanism for identifying, among other things, long-term risk?

It's not talking about have we ever identified long-term risks or if they're good long-term risks or bad long-term risks. We've talked about all those things. I'm talking about putting a mechanism in place to identify long-term risks. So it's asking for something that's actually very difficult to codify.

How do you mechanically identify very difficult things to identify, longterm risks? So, honestly, it'd be really hard to fulfill this recommendation. And if they have done a proper assessment of longterm risk in the past, the problem with this recommendation is that's



not what it's asking for. It's asking for a mechanism to do it. Like every year, we will have a meeting with the [best and brightest, that way we'll] accomplish it. Like if they said it's on the books to do it every year.

So I just want us to consider that perspective as we hopefully move right past this, but I just want to point out that it looks like, accidentally or on purpose, it's a very nuanced recommendation.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So, a mechanism to identify long-term risk, you're saying it ought to take place regularly, but you're not saying annually. Long-term, right?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yeah. So before Zarko goes, just to answer your comment to me, that would be one way you could address the recommendation, is to say we'll do it annually or semi-regularly or whatever. You could say, "Our mechanical process is every time the board bla bla, we do this thing." And whether that's a good thing or a bad thing, it would at least be mechanical. But anyway.

ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah, I just wanted to add that we saw some long-term risks in L.A., and talking about mechanism and publicly available documents, we should look at that document. So I'm really stunned that we jump into implementation of SSR1 recommendations without looking all relevant documents and we are looking at them during the meeting, which is really strange.



So we should look all documents and then judge, is there a mechanism or not? Is there process how to identify and how to tackle long-term risks? So in my opinion, what I saw in L.A., they're doing that.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Denise.

DENISE MICHEL:

I looked at all the documents available, and I was at the October meeting. And while I – again, repeating myself – I agree with Boban and other comments, they have a robust risk management framework, it remains unclear how the specific SSR-related near-term and long-term risks are that they maintain that assessment and [incorporation in the] risk management framework, and I think just even more important perhaps, how that is incorporated into the strategic plan and operating plan.

I think the latter may get us outside this specific recommendation, but I wanted to note that as something I'd like to come back to when we do more forward-looking recommendations.

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Questions on this too is what defined framework are they using, because there's a bunch of them out there.



RUSS HOUSLEY:

What Boban reported was based on best practices and risk management. So I don't know if that is a particular one or a hybrid or something.

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

I think it should be a standard framework and [it should be] published as to [what they're following.]

BOBAN KRISC:

I would like to add something or to clarify something. Regarding the standard, as already mentioned, it's based on best practices, and so we saw that they identify threats and they mitigate with controls the threats, yeah. So I would say they [must not] follow an ISO 3001 standard or something else. So for me, and as I've already mentioned, it's my personal opinion, it looks pretty good how they deal with the risks and how they identify threats and how they mitigate them.

And to the question, how does the risk get incorporated into the strategic plan, I've [inaudible] whether there is a strategic plan from 2016 to 2020, and when you only search in a document for the word "risk," you will see that you have [to, every section identify strategic risks.] So take a look at this one and then we can decide if this recommendation is fully implemented or not.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Is there anything to capture based on that, other than you've put the link? Okay. So, looking at 26, basically, this said "Prioritize timely



completion of a risk management framework," it says there was one and the board approved it. Is there anything more to say?

BOBAN KRISC:

No, I would say they published it and it was approved by board in 2013, and that's it. So fully implemented.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay, moving on to 27. Scott, Boban or Kerry Ann.

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

Hi. Boban, you can correct me, the only observation, taking into account the comments that Boban already put in, is that in terms of – it seems as if the recommendation was done, but in terms of [addressing sufficiency of addressing] the concern, what I had pointed to earlier is to just see there seems to be an absence of correlation of ongoing effort to ensure that there's publicly available information and addressing all the concerns raised.

Based on what Boban and Zarko said about not all the information would be public, but I think just to see if – that there is, as I said, an ongoing [reiterative] process that could be publicly available so persons could just be assured that these recommendations are taken into account.

I think, yes, as Boban pointed out, the risk management framework is in place, but I think in terms of just publicly, persons being assured that this is being done sufficiently. We were able to see the inside, as Zarko



said, based on the visit in L.A. that it's an ongoing, reiterative process, but as to whether there's anything that the public can be assured that this is happening, I don't know if it's something that we wanted to point to or not. I don't know, Boban, I don't know what you think.

BOBAN KRISC: Sounds good to me. Kerry Ann is talking about [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: I don't know what you're asking.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I'm sorry, I'm just wondering, Kerry Ann, if your comments were in

regards to 25 again or if you were speaking about 26.

BOBAN KRISC: We're speaking about 27.

KERRY ANN BARRETT: [I think] one of the things that I had pointed out is that the

recommendations [inaudible] the recommendations 25, 26, 27 are all

correlated in terms of it's all built around a risk management

framework, and even 27 is added on in terms of the comprehensiveness

of the risk management framework.

I think based on our discussion [on the finance in L.A.,] it's evident that

there is a risk management framework in place. What I think we've been



talking about, and even from, as I said, Zarko's comments concerning that from the inside, you're seeing that work is being done to update the risks, address the risks, it's just that from the public perspective, whether or not there is any information that could assure that public that the risk management framework is not only in place but that it has as cycle that reiteratively ensures that identified risks are taken into account and the systems are updated accordingly, I think that's what's missing. But in terms of the recommendation itself, it's clear that 25, 26, 27 just speaks to a comprehensive risk management framework is in place, 26 speaks to the completion of it and 27 speaks to the sufficiency of it or comprehensiveness of it.

So it's more of ensuring that [we could just comment] in general it is in place but highlight the need for, I guess, just transparency or just something for the public to know that it's being done. [Does that clarify it?]

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

My reading of the actual report was that 25 is actually more of a segue. If you look at the actual report, in 25, it's talking still at that stage about the chief security officer role, and I think what it looks to me like they were doing in the report was they were saying there needs to be some strategic inspection of the landscape and they were pointing at the chief security officer role at that time. And we've spoken about the chief security, stability, resiliency officer as having succeeded that potentially.



It looks to me like recommendation 25 is basically saying there should be a bridge between that strategic inspection and the risk management framework that comes down, and then the recommendations get much more focused on the risk management framework. So I would almost say the mechanization in 25 would be derived from the CSSR office.

KERRY ANN BARRETT:

Eric, just a clarification [that] all three are correlated though. Just want to see if you agree on that in terms of the recommendation and what SSR1 team intended was to ensure that there is a process a risk management framework, ideally addresses based on what was published, the functions, if not the roles, of the offices that we've spoken about earlier in the other recommendations higher up. So how I'm looking at all recommendations is that, yes, we may give comments on each individual one as to which ones were implemented or not implemented, but in terms of comprehensive comments on the issues that the SSR1 team was seeking to address, I just was saying I look at it as a holistic thing in terms of it was addressed. So I'm just wondering, are you disagreeing that it wasn't addressed, that 25, 26, 27 are not correlated? [inaudible]

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

I guess I'm saying I think there's a causal ordering to them, so not correlation. I think there's actually a causal progression from 24 to 25, onto 26, 27, and maybe 28.



KERRY ANN BARRETT: I think we're saying the same thing but probably just [differently.]

That's what I mean in terms of they're related, in terms of they build on

each other in terms of what they're trying to accomplish. We're saying

the same thing. I don't think we're saying something different, just

we're probably using different language. No?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah.

KERRY ANN BARRETT: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Is there anything else to capture here?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No.

RUSS HOUSLEY: 28, Norm.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, [I'm going to need] Scott or somebody to chime in with the SSAC

on this. So this is another interesting one, for two things. One is that ICANN is not good at always documenting some of the work they do,

and in this case, they probably should not be documenting and making $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$

public [inaudible].



RUSS HOUSLEY:

[inaudible].

NORM RITCHIE:

They probably should not be documenting some of these things publicly. So as far as evidence that they're doing threat detection and mitigation, there were some reports that existed up until 2015 where we saw summary [tables] and breakdowns as some of the work that they were doing in this regard. For whatever reason, that activity reporting no longer seems to be there. I've checked the OCTO report, activity reports, but that information isn't within them.

However, in conversations with members of the SSR team, I know that there actually is a lot of coordination effort going on, especially with law enforcement. So that's the ICANN part of this, because there's two parts. There's ICANN the organization doing this, but probably more importantly, there's the ICANN community does quite a bit.

So there is the – actually listed them down here, the SSAC itself, that's basically its role, RSSAC, TLD-OPS for the ccTLDs have a contact list of, I think, close to now every country. [Emergency] contact list that they actually check with, so in case of an incident, they can reach everybody. And they actually exercise that system.

And then the Public Safety Working Group also is now tasked with doing this. So, is information on threats being shared? Yes, I think that's occurring. Is anyone doing active hunting? I wouldn't know who to point to to say they're doing that though, so I haven't seen any evidence



of ongoing threat hunting, but that doesn't mean it's not occurring, because that would probably be done behind closed doors.

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Can we pause the recording?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:

Did you hear Scott?

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

We're off recording? Okay. Just FYI, with HackerOne, we are implementing their [VDP currently.] I just had a conversation the other night with John Crain. We are hopefully, as he put it to me, he's like, I tossed it, I tossed the question I sent Jennifer the other day back to his team that they are currently updating policies. Once the [VDP] goes public, HackerOne will manage their threat and vulnerability disclosure, and all that will be public and publicly available for transparency. So in other words, they will have a bug bounty program. Or I think they actually do now but it's not very active. But yeah, we'll be, as I've put it, we have a quarter milling hackers that are constantly going in people's networks.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

[inaudible].

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

We're hoping for a million like in three years.



UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] HackerOne, as they grow, it'll be HackerTwo and

HackerTen.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: So I think from a – again, like what was it, recommendation 15 above?

Like I think there's some TBD on this. [We can finish other comments.]

I'd be happy to answer them, but otherwise, we can resume recording.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, is this going to be covered by that mid-October announcement?

SCOTT MCCORMICK: That was a question John wouldn't answer. I don't know, Jennifer, if

you've heard back from anybody on that.

JENNIFER BRYCE: So I've passed on the question to some people who might be able to

answer.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah. Any other questions? Otherwise, we can resume the recording.

Denise.

DENISE MICHEL: Sure. Really good news that they're executing this contract. And if it's

done in a public way, I think it'd be a good thing to acknowledge as part

of this report as a good step in the right direction. However, I remain concerned as we are now at 28 and there have been a large number of recommendations that we have found to be not fully implemented where staff has indicated that they were – for some time now have been fully implemented. That's a meta issue I think the team needs to address, particularly as we lay out our recommendations for our report and our expectations on how staff carry them forward. I think there's certainly more that can be done in this area. Thanks.

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, I don't know if microphones matter right now because we're not recording. Yeah, so that's, again, a common theme, but it's really about the business maturity of the ICANN organization. But that can go back to the board. That's up to them to decide where they want that to lie. But what we have now – that doesn't mean the work is not occurring, it's [not] clearly evident.

DENISE MICHEL:

Yeah.

NORM RITCHIE:

And this is a great case in point. We should at least have known that this was coming. So that was in the plan somewhere. So to kind of find out it is occurring and no one knows about it, especially this group, is kind of unusual.



SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah, and also – actually, I'm pulling it up right now because I've talked

to John about it the other night – was the infrastructure that is listed in

the [VDP] is extensive. So it involved IANA, it involves obviously ICANN,

all of the websites and stuff like that, but there's more than just the

websites that's included in the target list.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: In mid-October.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah, right? Yeah, I'm not sure what policies need to be updated. John

was kind of giving me a little bit of scoop on it, but it sounded like it was $\,$

just a formality. Some of the policies don't match what the [VDP] was

going to say and all of that. So yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Resume recording?

JENNIFER BRYCE: [Okay, so I'm about to resume it. And so should I just

summarize][inaudible]?



SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Yeah. I think we need to draw a line around it, but yeah, I don't want to prematurely put something down when I know that something's coming down the pipe. Right? So if we can hold off as long as possible, that'd be great, but I'm just looking at – let's see here, when was the last contact? Go ahead.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So I have a suggestion. How about when we go back on the recording, we say that we're planning to circle back on that recommendation because we're pending new information?

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Yeah, I'm fine with that.

JENNIFER BRYCE:

[inaudible]. Thanks. So we're back – we had just paused the recording for a couple minutes at the request of the review team. We're resuming the recording now with the summary comment being that the team is going to hold off on this recommendation for the time being, pending new information, and we'll readdress later in October.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Thank you. This took longer than I was hoping, but pleased we're done with this for today. I know I need a break, maybe, so let's take a break and then we'll resume the agenda when we get back.



DENISE MICHEL: How long is our break, do you think?

RUSS HOUSLEY: How about 15 minutes?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Two months.]

DENISE MICHEL: Okay. Thank you, Russ.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, until mid-October.

[inaudible] and to lead those discussions. I think I asked Zarko, Boban and Kerry Ann, who I think were the leads when we had the pre-pause, to at least help us get our heads around what steps need to be taken next and what kind of resources this team's going to have to apply to get those. That's where we're trying to get to, which will help us update the workplan and figure out how we're going to get the work done.

We need to leave this room at 1:15, so it's being turned over for the next group that's in here. And we need to be in the new room, which is 120, just across the way there at 1:30 when the CCT team is going to brief us. Okay? So let's see how far we can get between now and 1:15. Let's start with Work Stream 2.



BOBAN KRSIC:

Hi. Yeah, I can kick it off. So, Work Stream 2, ICANN SSR, that was [inaudible]. So we have a description of the activities and we have some items that we identified due to, I don't know, meeting in Madrid. And yeah, we talk about this stuff in our last factfinding meeting in October 2017. And can we maybe get a slide from Monday? Is it possible?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:

[inaudible]?

BOBAN KRSIC:

From the backup. Or we can scroll also this one, it's okay. So yeah, it's okay. So we have topics like risk management, we have incident management, business continuity management. There was security management inside, and yeah, we defined work items and discussed them. So we had subject matter experts at ICANN for two days, and they showed how they organize things like what processes are in place and how they deal with them. And we wrote it down, and I didn't find the [notes] of this one. So if anyone from the team here has a link to the Google document, it would be awesome [inaudible] share it with the SSR2 team.

So my question was, is it the right way to have the structure here in place, and are the topics and the work items complete, or should we reorganize something depending on the result of the review of SSR1? And that's what we should decide together, yeah, and also how we move forward with this. And because there is – it's not a strawman, we



wrote it only down, so what we identified and what we heard in L.A. And I think this stuff could be very good input for our report.

So yeah, how to deal with it, what to do with it, is it complete, is there any gap, should we reorganize something? These are the questions. Yeah, so team, what do you think about it?

ALAIN AINA:

Okay. Yes, I definitely think that we have to look at this and maybe narrow it down, because one of the issues [inaudible] this is a review. I think we had this discussion long ago and again and again. This is a review, and defining the scope of the review, I think we may not need to go deeper, like what we intended to do here. So I think we need to have this discussion again and when do we – the scope of the work and this ICANN SSR to see up to where we can go. Because [inaudible] this is the review. So for me, it is we who review how ICANN is implementing its effort.

So this is of time to see what we are really doing on a daily basis, and also maybe not – if you go there, you may be forced to get some recommendation into some operational things which I think are not part of our work scope. And also, I don't know if I would say that we have agreed, because I think I expect Denise and Eric to help me here, but I think if we agree to do a normal and simple review, the discussion on do we need to sign NDA to get access to certain document, but I think personally, we don't need NDA if we're just doing a general, broad review of this thing. So I think these are things we need to look at here.



DENISE MICHEL:

Yes. And thank you. So [I've] reviewed this again and in the context of our agreed upon updated scope and terms of reference, and it appears all to be solidly within our terms of reference document. I think it provides a good outline to start filling in for text, and I think sort of a good roadmap of how we would complete this Work Stream. I don't think it's productive to rehash previous conversations about scope, but I think we're at the point where if people have specific suggestions of what [in] this report doesn't belong or is missing, what we should do or shouldn't do, I think we're at the point where we need to talk in and write down very specific things so we can address them. Thanks.

NORM RITCHIE:

I have a specific suggestion, at least on point number two there, is there is a scary word in there that says "audit report." And what we're doing, I don't believe, is an audit. And that scares the hell out of people, including me. So we're recording, right? Not supposed to say stuff like that. So use those words inside voice, Norm. So can we change that? Actually just delete the word and "write a report." It's a review.

DENISE MICHEL:

You could do a replace all [inaudible] use the word "review." That's been explained on the list, I think, multiple times that the intention was not to conduct an audit in the full sense of the word as is known in the U.S. but rather to do a review assessment of this area.



NORM RITCHIE: Yes, we have to do that cleansing across our documents.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I'm not hearing anyone actually ask for whole things to be removed

or new bullets to be added.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sorry, in the e-mail that Jennifer sent yesterday, there is a "Planning for

Work Streams 2, 3 and 4, see work items in document here. Here's the

link." Okay, go ahead, Zarko.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, just wanted to add that I proposed the other day, Sunday

meeting, that we should a little bit reshuffle everything. And I think we

can divide this subtopic into two different topics. One will be ICANN

security related to ICANN's systems and procedures, and another one is

for external stuff. So that's compliance and EBERO and things like that.

And maybe we should consider adding a few things.

What Boban said, we – and I actually said the same, we did good analysis of what was intended. Personally, I had some questions, but

we got paused and I couldn't go further in Abu Dhabi. I had few

additional [inaudible], but just a few clarifications what they heard in

L.A. And I think we are more than 80% ready to draft report on this.



RUSS HOUSLEY:

What I'm struggling to figure out, since I was not involved in putting this together or doing any part of the gathering, is how much work is left and who's going to do it. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

BOBAN KRSIC:

Hi. We've started to arrange it in a Trello board. We used Trello to organize the tasks, and we divided these work items in, I think, six or seven key action steps. And when we go to the Wiki, there is a link, you will find the link to Trello, and there is also a link to the draft L.A. report. And in Trello, there are some responsibilities for every of these work items. So if we could go to Trello and to use it to review the action items. Yeah, thank you, Jennifer.

So you can see we have something – yeah, it's [a combined] board so we have something in the backlog, something that [was in] work, something was pending. And from left to right, so there, [you'll] find the topic for business continuity management, for the incident response process, then everything what is related to gTLD delegation, registry stuff, something to risk management. Okay, there is task-finalized workplan. Then [ISMS.] ISMS was out the scope, we decided to put it out of the scope. The registrar stuff, yeah, and that's it.

So when we go pick one, maybe under work, and six, that's the first one in the [lane.] And can you click on this one, please, Jennifer? Yes, thank you. Then you will see there are four members that were related, and we had a lead. Yeah, that was James. James decided to step off from



the review team, and yeah, that's it. We have to-dos, so it's well-organized.

The only thing that we need to do is find for every key item step one who is responsible for the subtopic and take a look at the description. Is it full? Are the to-dos complete? And who can assist in writing or what else, the report? So, what do you think about it? Should we work with Trello to organize it, could we – who's this? Oh, Denise, yeah, cool. James, Noorul, Norm, so we have three of them here. Yes, I think it's a good management tool to organize the tasks and take a look at it. If you don't have the URL to it, Jennifer could invite you to the board. So in the end, all team members should be here and every card should have a minimum of three members and one who is responsible for it. So it could be a way how to work on it.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Zarko, how does this fit with what you want to do in terms of reorganizing the work?

ZARKO KECIC:

That's exactly I want to do with entire working group and all tasks, because what we have done with SSR1 was unproductive and slow. And I think this is the way to go, to attach exact tasks to small group of people and let them all work. Although I expected that leader of group will do everything, but he refuses. [Boban.]



RUSS HOUSLEY:

Thank you. Okay, now I understand what you're proposing, and this seems perfectly reasonable to me and I think having the whole group go through the whole thing will certainly not be done in Kobe. But we do need to update the people associated with each of these tasks in order to know that some of them probably have members who left, for example, and the new members are not represented.

So, how did you mechanically go about putting the names on each of these tasks? Did you do a Doodle? What did you do?

BOBAN KRSIC:

I think it should be a self-selection process [inaudible] each individual. So I think everything is – or who think [they] can assist in one of these topics should put his name here, and yeah, I think it's better, and if there are people who are not related to [any task,] then I think Russ will put them to one of these, need maybe more resource or something else, yeah. But we should start with review these tasks and put all people here in the Trello board and then they can arrange it.

ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah. I somehow agree with Boban, but not in full, because just self-attaching people to the team is not something that we want. There are the tasks, and there is a group of people who attended meeting in L.A. So if somebody didn't go there, cannot be just fully attached to the task and expecting them to pick up and do a job correctly.

But on the other hand, we'll need skills from some people who are not there or who are new to fulfill tasks. So we are a group of volunteers and



nobody can force us to do something, but at least we can ask, Russ, can you help us with this? And if you agree, you're in.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay, so I'm not familiar with this tool, Trello I think you said is the name. And basically, Jennifer's going to give us all access to this, so we can go add our names. And is there a place where you can see what all the tasks are and what all the names are, and just see how that's laid out at the moment? No? You have to drill down each one? Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Just scroll up the left. You've seen the tasks, right?]

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, some of these [are scroll,] right?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, I see. [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Okay. So, Jennifer, can I ask you to go through and remove

anyone's name who's resigned from the team?

JENNIFER BRYCE: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, great. So, was this technique used for the streams three and four

as well, or is this - no, okay. Zarko.

ZARKO KECIC: I think yes, but – go ahead.

BOBAN KRISC: Yeah, thank you, Zarko. I think there should be subtopic groups. There

are five boards, yeah? And Jennifer, could you maybe go to the overall dashboard so that we – yeah, here we are. Okay. So we [start grouping,

using it.]

JENNIFER BRYCE: From memory, the other groups weren't using Trello, except for this

one, group five which was James Gannon.

NORM RITCHIE: I'm in Trello, here, and there's a note at the bottom saying anyone on

the Internet, including Google, can see this board, but only the

members can edit it. So this is public.

ZARKO KECIC: You're a security guy.

NORM RITCHIE: Well, everything's recorded anyway, but don't make it easy for them.

ALAIN AINA: But everything we do is supposed to be public, right?

NORM RITCHIE: Yes, so I guess I'm kind of asking that question, are you okay with that?

DENISE MICHEL: I think team members should use whatever tools they think will help

make them most productive, and if we need to ask staff to take screenshots or copies or download copies and put it on a public list, I

think we should do that. But I think the driving factor here should be what tools people would like to use to get their work done most

efficiently.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That makes sense to me. I'm just trying to get my head around the tasks

that have to happen and the resources from the team that are going to

be need to do that. That helped me understand what's here. And for the

other teams, is the only thing we have the Google doc? I'm sorry, the

other stream?

ZARKO KECIC: For other streams, obviously, we don't have Trello, and I agree with

Denise, everybody can use whatever they feel comfortable. But what I

would like to see at the end of this face-to-face meeting is to have clear

steps how we are going to proceed. And how we'll attach people, it

doesn't matter is that in Word document, in Excel, in Trello or some

other tool, but to see how we'll go further and speed up with this work.



Obviously, what I said previously may look to somebody that I'm against having people who just join us onboard for this. It is not true, you're welcome, and I believe you can help a lot. But also what I would like to see is some other topics that we do not have right now. I mentioned the other day that we're talking about BGP hijacking and securing BGP. And there is no something like that. You remember we discussed in Madrid and we stopped with that.

There are a couple more other things that should be added, and I believe since nobody touched that, we'll have job for new people and they'll help us with [all the] topics. So I believe that's the way to go.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yeah, I think my two cents would be we might touch on those sorts of things with one of the other sub-streams besides the ICANN SSR, right? Or were you thinking it would be in there? Or maybe I misunderstood. Like, yeah, when we're talking about larger SSR issues, outward-facing stuff, we were going to address those things in another sub-stream, and we did talk about BGP and stuff like that.

ZARKO KECIC:

It doesn't matter in what sub-stream. We can reshuffle everything and move part of ICANN SSR to some other sub-stream. It doesn't matter. We are allowed to do that, and it will be good to do that. We'll have to update the terms of reference, which I believe we should do anyway. And maybe we can add some other sub-stream. We are losing one initial, IANA transition. There is nothing, so I don't believe we'll write



anything on that except that we looked at that and we didn't see any relation with SSR.

So everything's open, and where we are going to put some stuff, it doesn't matter.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

We kind of need a strawman though, right? To organize ourselves, and that seemed easier to start with where we were than to put a blank sheet on the [paper.] Norm?

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, I agree with that, not everything fits nicely into these sub-streams, but [there should] still be a work item to do something. But we kind of have a category there called "other." Could we give it a better name and put those disparate work items that don't necessarily fit nicely into a group and put them in there? Would that work?

DENISE MICHEL:

Why wouldn't that fit into DNS SSR? Using the strict sort of definition of DNS. Yeah, I see. Yeah, we were kind of using – because the bylaws aren't very accurate when they refer to DNS, and so I think we agreed early on that it was not the technical but more the lax, the kind of very broad interpretation of what DNS stands for.



NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, but in this case, ICANN actually has – that's outside of ICANN's direct influence. Sorry, that's the wrong word. Control. But they can certainly influence.

DENISE MICHEL:

I think the purpose of the DNS SSR was to take a look at the more external issues, issues where ICANN only had a piece of the responsibility, but also areas where ICANN was a facilitator, colleague, discussant. Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So I think these topics are really healthy topics to talk about, and I think we'd probably want to – I don't want to walk past any of them, because I think we could definitely come up with a better way to sort of draw lines around the things we're talking about. So we could talk about registry functions, and that doesn't just mean DNS registry, that could be registry as in like IANA registry of identifiers and numbers. So we could do that, and we might wind up on a slippery slope that takes a long time. So I don't mean that we shouldn't do it, but we might want to time bound it.

So if we want to create new buckets or something like that, we could say something sort of like outward-facing management, inward-facing management, and that would sort of be like, "Oh, we're talking about IANA org internal systems and info sec and the internal side," and we're talking about presence in the routing system for L-root and we're talking about the IANA registries that were maintained for the IETF, and



all those things, we could come up with new ways to describe them so that they're sufficiently able to encompass the things that we think are important, so like route hijacking in general, I don't think any of us are saying that it's our remit to worry about route hijacking in general, but certainly, there's operational infrastructure that ICANN has purview over, has a remit to maintain.

And we do potentially have a concern that we want to look at there, right? So, is the conversation how do we describe these more accurately so that the Work Streams make more sense? Is that what we're thinking?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Okay.

DENISE MICHEL:

I like the elegant separation of inward-looking and outward-looking. All of this, of course, is bounded by our scope and terms of reference, which again and again commits to staying within ICANN's mission and objective as defined in the bylaws.



NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I'm in no way saying this should be an exhaustive, long list, but

there may be some higher value items that if we did not talk about them

or address them, the community would say, "Why did you not do that?"

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, absolutely.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So then as a strawman, I propose that between now and when we

change rooms, we should create the buckets that we're happy with. At

the end of that time, since this is a relatively short amount of time and we have a necessary interruption at that point anyway, we just live with

what we have unless there's some real exigent circumstance. Is that

fair? So basically, that gives us like 30 minutes or something like that. Is

that too brief?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I don't think workplans are things that you do and they just stay

that way forever. So whatever we come up with the next 30 minutes, as

we explore things, we're going to find new things.

DENISE MICHEL: [Yeah, that's a good point.]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [Absolutely.]

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, are we going to use this tool, or are we going to use the Google doc?

Can't hear you.

BOBAN KRSIC: I would propose to start with the Google doc and then to transfer it to

Trello because it's easier to work in a Google doc.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so we have a Google doc that has the streams in it, and each of

the streams has some numbered work item or key action steps, I guess, and that's what we're talking about rearranging, right? Okay, so,

suggestions for changes?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So, I suggest we have – oh, for the categories or for the documents?

Sorry.

RUSS HOUSLEY: For the categories that are – and we implement them in the document.

I'm just very confused by your question.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Sorry. Okay, maybe I should just be quiet, but how about inward-facing,

outward-facing to replace DNS SSR and ICANN SSR? And then other

people can propose changes [as subtopics.]



RUSS HOUSLEY: So, I typed that in as subtopics two and three, inward, outward. Right?

Now, what changes do we want to make to the categories in them?

BOBAN KRSIC: Regarding the security management system, there was a decision that

this subtopic should be out of scope, but I don't know why. So maybe

anyone from the team has -

RUSS HOUSLEY: [Which number?]

BOBAN KRSIC: It's the second one, ICANN's ISMS. There was a decision or something. I

think there was a board letter regarding two topics. When I go to Trello, there are two and [a lane] of waiting for board response, and we talk about it to take this one out of scope, the second one here, and another one. Yeah, everything what is related to compliance and registry agreements. So this topic here labeled – I think it's somewhere on the

next page. Maybe number seven. No, this is also part of - no? Six or

seven [inaudible]. No.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible].

BOBAN KRSIC:

Yeah. I think that is also out of scope.

DENISE MICHEL:

I don't see how we can say it's out of scope. It's not only addressed in SSR1, which is part of our assessment, but it goes to the heart of ICANN's obligation and the actual agreements, contracts with the registries and registrars explicitly include obligations that relate to security and stability. If that's not in scope, I don't know what is.

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, the new gTLD program had a lot of additional – in the applications and in the contracts. And that was the emphasis for the new gTLDs, right? There was a strong emphasis to increase the security requirements. So I tend to agree with Denise on this.

I did want to talk about too though, we mentioned it then skipped over it, I think that one's actually very simple, is that if we're going to assess whether they have a certification, the answer is no, they don't. Recommendation, should get one. It's kind of that short.

DENISE MICHEL:

Yeah. I did not mean at all to cut off the discussion of this item, and if you feel like we need to discuss it further or more in-depth or if you feel like it needs to be explicitly bounded in some way, that perhaps there's some interpretation that causes people concern about going out of scope, and I think it would be good to discuss it now.



NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, so if I walked up here and looked at that, it looks like we are performing an audit. Yes, number two. That's basically what are the requirements to achieve 27001. I kind of would read it that way. I don't think [– not our intent. Our intent to see] a high-level review on some of these items that happen to – they're the headings from the 27001. That's the confusing part. [There's much detail] is what I'm saying.

BOBAN KRSIC:

Okay. So it could be "Perform a high-level review of ICANN's information security management system."

NORM RITCHIE:

[inaudible].

ALAIN AINA:

And to add, as I've said before – and thank Norm for insisting – we have to be careful on the wording and how we – because this is [normal,] when you come to a review or whatever, so the wording, we have to be careful, the wording and make sure that we all have the same understanding. Because sometimes, we write one sentence, but what it means for them is different from what it means for Zarko or for Alain.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Eric, is that a hand up? Okay.



ZARKO KECIC: Just to correct this one, perform high-level review of ICANN's

responsibilities. It is not responsibilities, we are reviewing how ICANN is

doing that.

DENISE MICHEL: Activities?

ZARKO KECIC: Activities.

NORM RITCHIE: But we still have in there – you're basically saying we are doing the gap

analysis similar to the 27001, so we're basically doing the audit.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [We did do a gap analysis.]

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: We did do a form of – it's trying to be descriptive of the kinds of things

we did, so we shouldn't take out that we did that, but we could certainly describe it differently so it seems less canonical. So instead f gap analysis, we could do something else. But this is probably a good time

to propose text.



NORM RITCHIE: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible] Google doc.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible]

BOBAN KRSIC: I would say let's delete it, because we stated, "Perform high-level

review of ICANN's activities related to information security management. This includes but is not limited to the following." I think

that's it.

DENISE MICHEL: I think that works for me. Do you want to say, "May include?" Are we

committed to every single item on this list? I'm thinking that we should also, as we're going through this, think about our priorities and limited

time and resources. And if there's something that we think doesn't rise

to the level of "This is important and we need to include it," we should

think about deleting it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I agree, [inaudible] time and people.



ZARKO KECIC: I have one wish with business continuity here. I don't believe we are

getting any business continuity plan [evaluation] and cannot perform

[evaluation of] business continuity procedures.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Which number –]

ZARKO KECIC: [The last three.]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: That was one of the things we interviewed them about extensively.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, but business continuity plan, do you –

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, we had a lot of discussion about that. The quality and the

presence of the answers were independent.



NORM RITCHIE:

Excuse me. So I'm going to come back to this again [inaudible] overarching thing is going to come out of this to the board is what level of maturity do they want the ICANN organization to be at. And that affects all these types of points.

ZARKO KECIC:

Yeah, but I think our job is to put fact findings and to recommend that ICANN should work on it. And at one point, I proposed to have two documents, one which is public with recommendations and another one where we have deeper explanation what we meant, but giving that only to ICANN, not to the public.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

On number four, you have a bullet on domain name contractual obligations and compliance. Doesn't that overlap with something else we were just looking at? Trying to understand how that one – what it means to be part of the security incident management system regarding their contractual obligations.

DENISE MICHEL:

Well, there's SLAs in those agreements directly related to security incidences and breaches. And I think you're right, it could be folded into the other item which is broader, which relates to really all the SSR-related items in the registry and registrar agreements and IDN programs.



RUSS HOUSLEY: Right.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [I'd assume of] ICANN staff, this was focused on their security posture,

so you'd want to make sure they [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: This is the inward section now.

DENISE MICHEL: So we're combining four and five, right?

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, Denise, four seems to be about being proactive, right? And five

seems to be looking back how well they do when an incident actually

happened. Is that not right?

DENISE MICHEL: it seems that we should then make four both a review of past incidents

and assessment of current or future abilities. I just think for – I guess the

way I'm looking at it is for efficiency's sake, if you're going to have some

volunteers looking at the space, it makes sense to me to look at what are the key incidents that have happened and how they've been

handled, and then what are their capabilities today and are they ready

for future incidences. It seems like it makes sense to me to put them all

together, but I'm open to however people want to do it.



NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, so, sorry, I was saying there it doesn't have to be on an actual

incident, it could just be an exercise, go through it that way.

DENISE MICHEL: Also, as you're reading this, it strikes me that six and seven can be

combined. Every bullet, I think, we have in six is an obligation [and] a registry or registry contract as well. So perhaps we can reword – do you think we can reword things to make it one category? So we're looking at both ICANN org responsibilities and activities as well as I guess

contracted parties' obligations.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So, six and seven, six is talking about vetting the providers of these

services and seven is talking about the registries being able to

demonstrate that they've got them, right?

DENISE MICHEL: So, seven is about – yeah, I guess I need to think about this. Seven is

more overarching. I think six goes under seven is, I guess, how I'm

looking at it. And I think -

RUSS HOUSLEY: Denise, could you propose some words? Because I'm not getting it.

Because one has to do about vetting ahead and the other about what's

their track record in actually doing the activities.



NORM RITCHIE:

Also, I'm just looking at five there to. That one probably would not be a public document, may not be a public document at the end. If [you're looking at a gap analysis for their] incident response, you probably don't want to publicize that. So that would be an example of one of the documents that would be handed to ICANN Org.

DENISE MICHEL:

Yeah. I would agree with that, but Norm, don't you think though in addition to that, there's space to note where – that we've reviewed this and it's where it should be or we've reviewed this and offered some private recommendations of how things should be changed, or we found this to be acceptable or in need of work? Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Are we done with inward and ready to move to outward? Okay, we have just a few minutes left, like seven. So, looking at outward one, the last item in the list, what are we going to say about nation-state firewalls?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Wow, this is a trip down memory lane. I do remember us talking about that, and it was in the vein of the great firewall, DNS rewriting. Well, I don't remember where we were going with that exactly, but I think this was early on, we have like alternate root there and stuff like that. So there was the beginnings of discussions forming. That was, I believe, Madrid, was a year and a half ago.



RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I understand why talking about what the SSR consequences of an

alternate root are, but I think calling out nation-state firewalls as a mechanism for implementing an alternate root kind of gets us in a place

that's difficult, which is why I asked the question, what's this bullet [to

mean?]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I think enough time has passed, I think recollections are sufficiently

foggy that if you were to remove that, it would probably be okay. So we

were brainstorming, and that one I know came up brainstorm – I don't

know if we revisited it afterwards, so there's a different level of maturity

around these bullet items versus the ones that we had after we got done

with the site visit in L.A. for the previous category.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Geek Squad maintains it for you.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Do we have to leave this room in five minutes?

RUSS HOUSLEY: We do.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So maybe now is not the time to kick the hornet's nest over.

DENISE MICHEL: Is this a good time to break?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Is it Miller time?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does anyone want to offer any other changes to this section? Okay, then

I think it's time to move to the next room, to 120. Is that correct?

JENNIFER BRYCE: [Okay. Good question.] I think so.

NORM RITCHIE: Should we take our name cards with us?

JENNIFER BRYCE: Yes, please.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I was going to have Jennifer collect them all and hand them all out

again. Yes, room 120.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]

